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THE TAX TREATMENT OF COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
BORIS I. BITTKER*
Introductory.-Section 331 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that a complete liquidation of a corporation is to be treated
by the shareholder as a sale of his stock, which will ordinarily pro-
duce capital gain or loss, and section 334 (a) provides that the share-
holders' basis for property acquired on the liquidation is its fair
market value at the time of distribution.1
These rules, which are of long standing, led to the tax avoidance
device known as the "collapsible corporation," which in its turn led,
in 1950, to the enactment of what is now section 341. As will be
seen, section 341 reaches a good many corporations besides those at
which it was aimed; and its application is not limited either to
"temporary" corporations or to corporate liquidations.2 Although
section 341 has thus come to encompass a wide range of corporations
and transactions, it can be understood best after the "collapsible
corporation" itself is examined.
The collapsible corporation first attracted attention in the motion
picture industry. A producer, director and leading actors would or-
ganize a corporation for the production of a single motion picture.
They would invest small amounts of cash and agree to work for
modest salaries, and the corporation would finance the production
with borrowed funds. When the motion picture was completed, but
before it was released for public exhibition, the corporation would be
liquidated. The stockholders would report the difference between the
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331 (a) (1), 1221. Taken literally, the collapsi-
ble corporation provisions of the Code would refer to all corporations, foreign
and domestic, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations, and United States
Possessions corporations. Although no mention of this is made by the
Code or the Regulations, it has been suggested by Gibbons that these pro-
visions may be applicable to a foreign corporation which does not have any
property in the United States. See, GIBBONS, TAx FACTORS OF BASING INTER-
NATIONAL BusINEss ABROAD 30 (1957).
2. See Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765, 1 AFTR 2d 1214 (4th Cir.
1958); The word "collapsible" considered apart from its context would
be somewhat misleading; but there can be no question, we think, as to
what Congress meant by a "collapsible corporation" as used in the statute.
That term was used to describe a corporation which is made use of to give
the appearance of a long term investment to what is in reality a mere
venture or project in manufacture, production or construction of property,
with the view of making the gains from the venture or project taxable, not
as ordinary income, as they should be taxed, but as long term capital gains.
Because the basic type of transaction which gave rise to the legislation in-
volved the use of temporary corporations which were dissolved and their
proceeds distributed after tax avoidance had been accomplished, the term
"collapsible corporation" was employed to describe the corporations used
for this form of tax avoidance; but the statute was drawn in broad general
terms to reach the abuse which had arisen, whatever form it might take.
253 F.2d at 767.
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cost of their stock and the value of their proportionate shares in the
completed film (established on the basis of previews) as long-term
capital gain under 331 (a) (1). For example, if their investment in
the stock was $10,000 and the value of the film (subject to a liability
of $100,000) was $510,000, the shareholders' profit would be $400,000,
on which the capital gains tax would be $100,000. Under section
334(a), the basis of the film in the hands of the shareholders would
be $510,000; and if the net rentals thereafter received equalled that
amount, they would have no further gain or loss since the fair market
value of the film could be amortized against the rentals.3 In effect,
the exhibition profit, which would have been taxed as ordinary
income to the corporation had it not been liquidated (or to the
producers if they had operated in noncorporate form from the outset)
was converted into capital gain. Moreover, instead of two taxes (a
corporate tax on the exhibition income and an individual tax at the
capital gain rate on the liquidation), there would be only one.
The collapsible corporation was also used by builders and investors
for the construction of homes in residential subdivisions. A corpora-
tion would be created to construct the houses, but it would be liqui-
dated before the houses were sold. The stockholders would report as
long-term capital gain the difference between the cost of their stock
and the value of the completed houses. The houses, which thus
acquired a "stepped-up" basis under section 334(a) equal to their
fair market value at the time of distribution, would then be sold,
ordinarily with no further gain or loss to be accounted for. Here
again, only one tax would be paid instead of two, and that one would
be computed at the capital gain rate.
Nonstatutory weapons against the collapsible corporations.-Even
without specific statutory authority, the Treasury was not entirely
helpless in the face of the collapsible corporation. If the promoters
receive inadequate salaries, something could be said for treating the
stock of the corporation as additional compensation, taxable as
ordinary income. Another possibility would be to treat the whole
transaction as an ineffective anticipatory assignment of income, re-
lying on the principle of Lucas v. Earl,4 that the tax cannot "be
escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skill-
fully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for
a second in the man who earned it. .. ." Another argument open to
the Treasury was that the collapsible corporation lacks substance and
3. If the proceeds exceeded, or fell short of, the estimated fair market
value, the shareholders would have additional income or deductible loss.
In O'Brien v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 376 (1955), it was held that income
in excess of the film's basis was taxable as ordinary income. But see
Brodsky & King, Tax Savings Through Distributions in Liquidation of Cor-
porate Contracts, 27 TAxEs 806 (1949). .
4. 281 U.S. 111, 115, 8 AFTR 10,287 (1930).
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that the arrangement should be taxed as a joint venture of the alleged
stockholders.5
So far, however, the Treasury has been unsuccessful in two efforts
to attack the collapsible corporation with these nonstatutory weapons.
One of these cases was not an entirely fair test of the cogency of the
nonstatutory arguments since the liquidation of the corporation there
involved was not prearranged but resulted from a change in plans
after one film had been completed.6 But when the Tax Court came
to pass on a collapsible corporation whose liquidation was apparently
contemplated at its inception, it described Herbert v. Riddell as
"almost identical," and similarly held for the taxpayers. 7 While these
initial setbacks would not have entirely foreclosed the development
of a nonstatutory weapon against the collapsible corporation, the
Treasury quite naturally shifted in 1950 to its newly enacted statutory
weapon and evidently gave up on pre-1950 transactions after its losses
in the Herbert and O'Brien cases.8
The framework of 341.-Although the details of section 341 are
quite intricate, its basic principle is simple: a shareholder who dis-
poses of his stock in a collapsible corporation in a transaction that
would ordinarily produce long-term capital gain must instead report
the gain as ordinary income. As applied to the Hollywood collapsible
corporation described above, section 341 (a) would compel the share-
holders to report their $400,000 gain on the corporation's complete
liquidation as ordinary income, a result which may well be more
costly than allowing the corporation to remain alive to realize the
income from the film with a view to ultimate liquidation. If section
341 (a) were applicable only to complete liquidations, however, the
shareholders would be able to escape by means of one of the following
devices:
1. A corporate distribution of the property without a surrender
of stock, since under 301 (c) (1) (A) the excess of the value of
the property over the shareholders' basis for their stock would
ordinarily be taxed as long-term capital gain.
2. A sale or exchange of the stock.9
5. See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5
TAx L. REV. 437, 439-48 (1950).
6. Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369, 41 AFTR 961 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
7. O'Brien v. Commissioner, supra note 3. See also Gross v. Commissioner,
236 F.2d 612, 618, 50 AFTR 68 (2d Cir. 1956), upholding the Tax Court's
refusal to "impute" a salary to corporate officers who preferred to take
their profits on a venture in the form of distributions on their stock.
8. But see Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412, 47 AFTR 1445 (9th Cir.
1955).
9. The new shareholders would of course be concerned about the corpora-
tion's low basis for its assets, but they could liquidate the corporation with-
out tax cost (since the value of the liquidating distributioh would presumably
be equal to the price paid for the stock). The property would thereupon
take on a new basis equal to its value, either under § 334(a), or, if the buyer
1959 ]
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3. A partial liquidation of the corporation, if the criteria of sec-
tion 346 could be satisfied.
In recognition of the fact that the above arrangements might be used
as a substitute for a complete liquidation, section 341 (a) provides that
gain so realized shall, to the extent that it would otherwise be long-
term capital gain, be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of
a noncapital asset.10
Section 341 (a) is applicable only if the shareholder's gain would
otherwise be long-term capital gain. The omission of short-term
capital gain from section 341 (a) is surprising since it permits the
collapsible corporation to retain its old advantages for the share-
holder who has capital losses that can be offset against any short-term
capital gain realized on the liquidation or sale. Section 341 (a) is also
inapplicable to losses. Finally, section 341 (a) applies to gain that
otherwise "would be considered" as long-term capital gain, but it
does not of its own force make gain taxable, with the result that it
will have no effect upon a tax-free exchange, e.g., under section 351
or section 1036.
Aside from the basic rules of section 341 (a), the statute consists
of (a) a definition of the term "collapsible corporation"; (b) a statu-
tory presumption in aid of the definition; and (c) two sets of limita-
tions that moderate the rules of section 341 (a) in certain circum-
stances. These aspects of section 341 will be examined in the remain-
ing sections of this chapter.
Two other limitations on the collapsible corporation are:
1. Section 337 (nonrecognition of corporate gain or loss on certain
sales in conjunction with a complete liquidation) is not applicable to a
was a corporation, under § 334(b) (2) the statutory '"imbell-Diamond"
rule, 14 T.C. 74, affd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 827 (1951).
10. There is a curious omission from this pattern: a distribution in re-
demption of stock that is treated as long-term capital gain under § 302(a).
The omission, which probably stems from carrying forward the pre-1954
reference to "partial liquidations" without noting that this term in the 1954
Code no longer includes stock redemptions, Rev. Rul. 57-387, 1957-2 Cum.
BuLL. 225, may be neutralized by the fact that most distributions by collapsi-
ble corporations will reflect a "corporate contraction" so as to constitute
partial liquidations, which are covered by § 341(a) (2). In an effort to bring
distributions by collapsible corporations within § 341 (a) (2), the govern-
ment may have to construe the term "partial liquidation" expansively,
contrary to its usual position.
It is also possible that a § 302(a) redemption could be brought within
§ 341 (a) (1), as a "sale or exchange" of stock, though this theory would be
open to the objection that the Regulations require an "actual" sale or
exchange, Treas. Reg. § 1.341-1 (1955); moreover, it would render the
inclusion of partial liquidations in § 341 (a) (2) redundant, since if a § 302 (a)
redemption is covered by § 341(a)(1), so would be a § 346 redemption.
Note, however, that the term "sale or exchange" is used in § 341 (c) to include
partial and complete liquidations-or at least so the Regulations assume.
Treas. Reg. § 1.341-3 (a) (1955).
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collapsible corporation "as defined in section 341 (b)."" This limita-
tion was partly relaxed in 1958.
2. Section 333 (nonrecognition of shareholder gain on elective
one-month liquidations) is not applicable to "a collapsible corpora-
tion to which section 341 (a) applies."' 2 In 1958, a limited group of
collapsible corporations became eligible for the benefits of section
333.13
The definition of "collapsible corporation."--The term "collapsible
corporation" is defined by section 341 (b) to mean a corporation that
was formed or availed of:
1. Principally for the manufacture of property (or for certain
other activities to be discussed below);
2. With a view to (a) a sale, liquidation, or distribution before
it has realized a substantial part of the taxable income to be
derived from the property, and (b) a realization by the share-
holders of the gain attributable to the property.14
If we take the extreme case of a corporation that is organized solely
to manufacture one motion picture and that, by agreement among the
shareholders at the time of its creation, is to be liquidated as soon
as the film is completed and before any income is received by the
corporation, the applicability of section 341 (b) is indisputable. More-
over, the use of an existing corporation for these purposes will not
escape section 341 (b), which deliberately employs the phrase "formed
or availed of."
Since many-perhaps most-ordinary business corporations are
"formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction or
11. If § 337 were applicable to collapsible corporations, the punitive pro-
visions of § 341 would be nullified. For the corporation would then be
able to sell its assets, avoiding the recognition of gain under § 337, while
the shareholders would escape § 341(a), because the corporation would have
realized (though without recognizing) its gain, and hence would not be a
collapsible corporation within the meaning of § 341(b). To protect § 341,
therefore, § 337 is made inapplicable to collapsible corporations by § 337(c)-
(1) (A). This limitation was partially relaxed in 1958; see § 341(e) (4).
12. Rev. Rul. 57-491, 1927-2 CuM. BuLL. 232 holds that this restriction does
not apply if the shareholders of the collapsible corporation can escape §
341 (a) by bringing themselves within § 341(d) (3).
13. For analyses of § 341 as amended by the 1954 Code, see DeWind &
Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 475 (1956); A Re-
Examination of Collapsible Corporations "With a View To" Coexisting with
Section 341, 1956 So. CAL. TAX INST. 549; Weyher & Bolton, Collapsible Corpo-
rations as Affected by the 1954 Code-Inventory and Unrealized Receivables,
13th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAxATION 657 (1955). Earlier discussions are
MacLean, Collapsible Corporations-The Statute and Regulations, 67 HAv. L.
REv. 55 (1953); Boland, Practical Problems of the Collapsible Corporation,
10th N.Y.U. INsT. ox FED. TAXATiON 657 (1955); Greenfield, Effect of Collapsi-
ble Corporation Provisions on Real Property Holding, id. at 91.
14. In the interest of simplicity, the statutory definition has been para-
phrased; some nuances have been sacrificed in order to concentrate on the
major issues.
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production of property," the major issue under section 341 (b) is the
existence of the requisite "view" to a sale, liquidation or distribution
before the corporation has realized a substantial part of the income
to be derived from the manufactured property. From section 341's
enactment in 1950 until very recently, the commentators debated
whether the word "principally" in section 341 (b) refers only to
"manufacture," or also modifies the phrase "with a view to," since
the statute would be appreciably narrowed if the corporation had to
be formed or availed of "principally" with a view to a sale, liquidation
or distribution before realizing a substantial part of the income at-
tributable to the property. The Regulations rejected this restriction
from the outset, 5 and two appellate courts have now done the same.1
The "classic" collapsible corporation was one whose shareholders
planned at the outset to liquidate it before corporate income was
realized. The Regulations, however, say that section 341 (b) embraces
any corporation, if a sale, liquidation or distribution before it has
realized a substantial part of the gain from the property "was con-
templated, unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized pos-
sibility."'1 This seems to suggest that the requisite "view" exists
whenever the controlling shareholders of a manufacturing corporation
consciously realize that they may decide-if the price is "right"-
to sell the corporation before it has realized the income from the
manufactured property. Of course, the statutory definition requires
that the "view" embrace not only a sale, liquidation or distribution
before the corporation has realized a substantial part of the taxable
income, but also the realization of gain attributable to the property
by the shareholders; 18 but the latter requirement will be satisfied
almost automatically if the property has appreciated in value. Nor
will the shareholder find much solace in the requirement that the
"view" exist during the manufacturing process,19 especially since it
is very uncertain when that process can be said to have terminated.
Finally, the Regulations state that the persons whose "views" govern
are "those persons in a position to determine the policies of the cor-
poration, whether by reason of their owning a majority of the
voting stock of the corporation or otherwise. '20 This may be hard on
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (2) (1955).
16. Weill v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805, 1 AFTR 2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1958)
("The corporation may be treated as collapsible if 'manufacture, construction,
or production' was a principal corporate activity even if the 'view to' was not
the principal corporate objective when the corporation was 'formed or
availed of . . . ."); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765, 1 AFTR 2d 1214
(4th Cir. 1958) (The argument that "principally" modifies "view" is "with-
out support of any rule of law or of grammar with which we are familiar").
17. Treas. Regs. § 1.341-2 (a) (2) (1955).
18. Section 341(b) (1) (B).
19. Treas. Regs. § 1.341-2 (a) (3) (1955).
20. Treas. Regs. § 1.341-2 (a) (2) (1955).
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minority shareholders, but Without such a rule section 341 could be
too easily nullified by keeping one shareholder in the dark.
It must be concluded, therefore, that the Regulations appear to
bring within section 341 any corporation that is formed or availed of
principally for the manufacture of property,21 if the persons in con-
trol recognize the possibility of selling their stock or liquidating the
corporation at a profit before it has realized a substaitial part of the
income from the property. Moreover, the natural tendency of ad-
ministrators and judges to assume that what did happen was intended
will probably lead to an emphasis on the objective results as dis-
tinguished from the shareholders' intent. This shift in emphasis can
be seen in the Regulations, which provide that a corporation will
"ordinarily" be considered collapsible if a shareholder sells his stock
or receives a liquidating or other nondividend distribution, provided
(a) he realizes gain attributable to property manufactured by the
corporation, (b) the manufacture of this property was a substantial
corporate activity, and (c) the corporation has not realized a sub-
stantial part of the taxable income to be derived from the property.
Zz
It is of course possible that in time the courts will come to require
proof that an early sale or liquidation of the corporation was more
than a "recognized possibility" before finding that the requisite
"view" existed, but until that occurs, the taxpayer will have to look
elsewhere for refuge from section 341.
One mode of escape is suggested by the Regulations which provide
that the corporation will ordinarily not be a collapsible corporation
if the sale, liquidation or distribution "is attributable solely to cir-
cumstances which arose after the manufacture .. . other than cir-
cumstances which reasonably could be anticipated at the time of
such manufacture .... '23 This limit on section 341 is less useful
than it might appear to be at first glance, because of the difficulty
of proving that the cause of the sale, distribution or liquidation could
not have been anticipated during manufacture,24 as well as because
the manufacturing process may include, under section 341, activity
long after the process is regarded as complete for other purposes.
25
21. Treas. Regs. § 1.341-5(b) (1955).
22. Treas. Regs. § 1.341-2 (a) (3) (1955).
23. For an example, see Rev. Rul. 57-575, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 236 (sale of
property to United States under a statute whose enactment was not antici-
pated.
24. Rechner v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 186 (1958).
25. See Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108, 1 AFTiR 2d- 1883 (2d
Cir. 1958), holding that the construction of an apartment project was not
complete when the municipal authorities issued a final ceitificate of occupancy,
since the landscaping was not then complete and the F.H.A. inspector had not
yet made his final inspection. See also the Tax -Court opinion in the same
case, 57,124 P-H Memo TC, suggesting that the term "construction" included
the obtaining of tenants for the project. In the appellate opinion, moreover,
the portion of the Regulations quoted above was found to be too .liberal .to
1959 ]
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A more promising escape is afforded by section 341(b) (1) (A),
providing that the "view" must embrace a sale, liquidation or dis-
tribution "before the realization by the corporation manufacturing
* . . the property of a substantial part of the taxable income to be
derived from such property." Evidently "the taxable income to be
derived" from the property means the taxable income that would
be realized if the property were sold at the time the shareholder's
gain arises. 26 If a substantial part of this amount has in fact been
realized, the, corporation is not "collapsible. '27 It is reported that
at one time the Internal Revenue Service would rule that fifty per-
cent was "substantial," so that upon realizing that portion of the
total income to be derived from the property, the corporation would
be free of section 341.28 While ordinarily one might safely assume
that as little as fifteen or twenty percent of a given amount is "sub-
stantial," the purpose of section 341 would be undermined if absolu-
tion were granted at such a low price.29 The result in this case,
where only ten percent of the profit was realized before liquidation,
can be easily defended; but it is difficult to find support in the
statute for its theory that a substantial amount of unrealized income
is fatal.3 0 The statute is clearly defective in this respect, since the
realization by the corporation of a substantial part of the taxable
income-even if it is fifty percent or more-may leave plenty of
life in the collapsible corporation device; and the Abbott case may
represent a judicial effort to give section 341 an application more in
keeping with its purpose.3 ' In addition to the problem of determining
how much income is "substantial," section 341 (b) (1) (A) poses
difficult questions for the corporation that engages in more than one
the taxpayers on the ground that the requisite "views" suffices if it exists at
any time during the corporation's life, although the decision does not rest
on this ground.
26. Levensen v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244, 1 AFTR 2d 446 (N.D. Ala.
1957); see also Sidney v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1155 (1958).
27. In theory, the amount actually realized is irrelevant, and the amount
which the shareholders intended the corporation to realize is controlling.
But this would make the corporation collapsible even if all the income had
in fact been realized by it, provided the shareholders had earlier entertained
the "view" that the income should not be realized by the corporation. The
Regulations, perhaps treating the events as they occur as the best evidence
of what was intended, clearly imply that actual-rather than intended-
realization is controlling. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.341-2(a) (4), 1.341-5(c) (2) (1955).
28. See Levenson v. United States, supra note 26 (51% held to be "sub-
stantial"; "it is inconceivable to this court that the realization of more than
50% . . . should not be regarded as substantial.").
29. See also Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537, 542, 2 AFTR 2d 5479
(3d Cir. 1958), stating that "The real question posed by the statute . . . is not
whether a substantial part of the total profit was realized prior to dissolu-
tion, but rather whether that part of the total profit realized [by the share-
holders] after dissolution was substantial . ..
30. For a similar approach, see Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(c)(2) (1955), which,
however, does not purport to be an exhaustive interpretation of § 341(b)
(1) (A).
31. See supra note 29.
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activity. If the corporation constructs two office buildings, for ex-
ample, has it realized a "substantial" part of the taxable income if
it sells one building outright at a profit of $50,000 but takes no steps
to realize any part of its potential profit ($12,000) on the second? The
Regulations take the position that the realization of all the income
from the first building does not excuse the failure to realize a sub-
stantial part of the income from the second.
32
The foregoing exposition has concerned itself with corporations
formed or availed of principally for the "manufacture" of property.
In point of fact, the statute uses the phrase "manufacture, construc-
tion, or production" of property, which may bring into the collapsible
category a somewhat wider range of transactions.3 Although at first
blush the phrase "manufacture, construction, or production" seems
to imply the process of altering the physical characteristics of
property, it is possible that it will be construed to embrace promo-
tional activity resulting in good will or consumer demand for a
product or, conceivably, for services.
Even if the corporation does not engage in the "manufacture,
construction, or production of property," it may fall within section
341 by engaging in the "purchase" of so-called "section 341 assets,"
provided this is done with a "view" to a sale, liquidation or distribu-
tion before it has realized a substantial part of the taxable income
to be derived from such property. This portion of the definition
(which was enacted in 1951 and expanded in 1954) is primarily aimed
at the use of collapsible corporations to convert the profit on in-
ventory property and stock in trade into capital gain:
The procedure used was to transfer a commodity to a new or dormant
corporation, the stock of which would then be sold to the prospective
purchaser of the commodity who would thereupon liquidate the corpora-
tion. In this manner the accretion in the value of the commodity, which
in most of the actual cases was whisky, would be converted into a gain
realized on the sale of stock of a corporation, thus opening the possibility
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(d), Example (2), (1955). But see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.341-2(a) (4) (1955), treating "an integrated project involving several
properties" as a single unit in determining whether a substantial part of the
income has ever been realized; and note also Examples (3) and (4) of
Treas. Regs. § 1.341-5(d) (1955).
33. For the scope of the term '"manufacture, construction, or production,"
of property, see the Glickman case, supra note 25; Abbott v. Commissioner,
supra note 29; Weil v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 809 (1957), affd per curiam,
252 F.2d 805, 1 AFTR 2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1958) (Partial completion, near com-
pletion, or even substantial completion are thus not effective substitutes for
full completion of the construction; Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (3) (1955), stating
that gain on unimproved property is within § 341 if attributable to improve-
ments made by the corporation on adjacent property; Rev. Rul. 57-346, 1957-2
CuM. BULL. 236, ruling that § 341 reaches appreciation in the value of un-
proved oil leases because their value had been enhanced by wells drilled
by the corporation on other leases; Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 178
(rezoning property preparatory to building thereon constitutes "construc-
tion").
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that it would be taxed as a long-term capital gain. H. R. Rep. No. 586,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). (Reprinted in 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 357, 375.)
If the transaction described by this committee report were sufficiently
blatant, the corporation might be treated as a sham so that the owner
would be regarded as selling the assets themselves,M or the repeated
use of the device might lead to the conclusion that the corporate stock
was held for sale in the ordinary course of business, which would
.make the capital gain provisions inapplicable. It was evidently
thought, however, that a statutory tool would be preferable to the
"single transaction" doctrine employed in the Jacobs case.35 Under
section 341 as amended, every corporation holding appreciated in-
ventory or stock in trade would be a potential target for section 341,
and its fate would depend on whether the elusive "view" were
present; but the Regulations cut down the scope of the statute by
conferring immunity on the corporation if its inventory property-
more precisely, the property described in section 341 (b) (3) (A) and
(B) -is normal in amount and if it has a substantial prior business
history involving the use of such property.36 It will be noted that
appreciated inventory property will get a stepped-up basis at the
Jlong-term capital gain rate if distributed in a liquidation to which
section 341 (a) does not apply.
The 1951 amendment brought into section 341 inventory property,
stock in trade, and property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of trade or business-the categories now found
in section 341 (b) (3) (A) and (B). In 1954, section 341 was expanded
to reach a purchase of "unrealized receivables or fees" and certain
property described in section 1231 (b) by section 341 (b) (3) (C) and
(D). At the same time, the generic label "section 341 assets" 'was
created for the property reached by both the 1951 and the 1954
legislation.
Although the Senate Report on the 1954 Code does not explain the
extension of section 341 to cover a purchase of "unrealized receivables
or fees," 7 presumably Congress sought thereby to prevent tax avoid-
34. Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412, 47 AFTR 1445 (9th Cir. 1955).
* 35. The language employed by § 341(b) to reach the device described in
the text is somewhat awkward: it might be argued that the corporation was
not formed or availed of for the purchase of stock in trade, inventory
property or property held for sale to customers-as required by § 341(b) (3)
(A) and (B)-since the whisky in question was not to be sold by the corpora-
tion. The Regulations, in accord with the obvious legislative intent, state
that the status of the property is to be determined without regard to
the collapsibility of the corporation, i.e., if the whisky would be inventory
in the hands of a "normal" corporation, it will have the same status in the
hands of the collapsible corporation.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(c) (1) (1955). See also Rev. Rul. 56-244, 1956-1
Cum. BuLL. 176 (inventory, though appreciated in value, was normal in
amount for volume of sales and not in excess of average inventory over
preceding several years; corporation held not collapsible ).
37. Despite the definition of "unrealized receivables or fees" in § 341(b) (4)
-or perhaps because of it-the term is most ambiguous, especially as con-
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ance by an individual on a cash basis by means of a transfer to a cor-
poration of his rights to collect fees or the sales price of goods (which
would produce ordinary income on collection), to be followed by a
sale of the stock or liquidation of the corporation at the capital gain
rate. The inclusion of section 1231 (b) property in the category of
"section 341 assets" is less clear, since capital gain can ordinarily be
realized on the sale of such property without resort to the use of a
collapsible corporation. The change may have been intended to pre-
vent dealers in apartment houses or other rental property from con-
verting ordinary income into capital gain through the use of a sepa-
-rate corporation for each parcel of property (a device that might
have been defeated without resort to section 341 by treating the
corporate stock as held for sale and hence, under section 1221 (1), as
a non-capital asset); but the statute is written in broader terms.3 8
Another unexplained 1954 change is the limitation of the term
'"section 341 assets" to property held for a period of less than three
:years. Because of this limitation, if a commodity is held by the cor-
poration for more than three years (including the holding period
of certain predecessors) after manufacture, construction, production
or purchase has been completed, the shareholders can sell their stock
or liquidate the corporation without running afoul of section 341 (a).39
To safeguard its statutory purpose, section 341 provides that a
corporation "shall be deemed to have manufactured, constructed,
produced, or purchased property" if any of the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. If the corporation engages in manufacture, construction, or pro-
duction of property "to any extent." Section 341 (b) (2) (A). By
'virtue of this provision, the corporation need not have originated or
completed the process of manufacture, construction or production;
any step is sufficient.
2. If the corporation holds property having a basis determined by
reference to the cost of such property in the hands of a person who
manufactured, constructed, produced or purchased it. Section 341
cerns the status of rights under long-term contracts. For some of the diffi-
culties, see DeWind & Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56 CoLuM. L. REV.
475, 497-502 (1956). Note also that the "unrealized receivables or fees"
must have been "purchased" by the corporation. This implies the acquisi-
tion of a chose in action from a third party, but it is essential to the statutory
purpose to include accounts receivable resulting from the corporation's own
sale of merchandise or performance of services.
38. The breadth of this part of § 341 seems to be responsible for a 1958
amendment, entirely excluding certain corporations from § 341, infra at p. 142.
39. If property is transferred to a corporation to be held for more than
three years for the sole purpose of obtaining capital gain on the sale or
liquidation of the corporation, the transaction might be attacked as a sham
without resort to § 341. Jacobs v. Commissioner, supra note 34. Or, if the
"aging" process. enhanced the value of the property, it might constitute
the "manufacture, construction, or production of property."
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(b) (2) (B). This provision reaches such devices as the transfer of
manufactured property or "section 341 assets" to a corporation by a
tax-free exchange under section 351, or the use of a second corpora-
tion into which a collapsible corporation is merged. The statute does
not state whether the successor corporation inherits not only the
collapsible property, but also the requisite "view."
3. If the corporation holds property having a basis determined by
reference to the cost of property manufactured, constructed, pro-
duced, or purchased by it. Section 341 (b) (2) (C). Because of this
provision, it will be impossible to escape section 341 by causing a
corporation to manufacture property and to transfer it by a tax-free
exchange (e.g., under section 1031 (a) or in a corporate reorganiza-
tion), under a plan calling for the sale or liquidation of the corpora-
tion following the exchange and before realizing income from the
newly-acquired property.
A further buttress to section 341 is the inclusion of holding com-
panies in the term "collapsible corporation." If a corporation is
employed to hold the stock of a manufacturing corporation, the parent
corporation will be a "collapsible corporation" by virtue of section
341 (b) (1) if it is formed or availed of with a "view" to a sale, liquida-
tion or distribution before the manufacturing corporation has realized
a substantial part of the taxable income from the property. In Rev.
Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 Cumulative Bulletin 174, it was held that the
holding company becomes noncollapsible (so as to protect its share-
holders) if it sells the stock of the subsidiary and is taxed under sec-
tion 341 (a) on its gain, notwithstanding some difficulty in bringing
this result within the literal terms of the statute.
The rebuttable presumption of collapsibility: section 341(c).-In
1954, section 341 was amended to add a rebuttable presumption of
collapsibility if the fair market value of the corporation's "section 341
assets" is (a) fifty percent or more of the fair market value of its
total assets and (b) percent or more of the adjusted basis of such
"section 341 assets." The theory of the rebuttable presumption is that
if the "section 341 assets" are substantial in amount and have risen
significantly in value above their basis, it is reasonable to place the
burden of proof disproving collapsibility on the taxpayer.40 In order
to prevent manipulation, section 341(c) (2) provides that cash, stock
and certain securities are to be disregarded in determining the
corporation's "total assets"; otherwise, the shareholders of a corpora-
40. Even without the presumption of § 341(c), the taxpayer has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of correctness that accompanies the Com-
missioner's action in assessing a deficiency. What, if any, weight § 341(b)
adds to this nonstatutory presumption is doubtful. Perhaps it is only "a
handkerchief thrown over something covered by a blanket," as Randolph
Paul said of an analogous statutory presumption. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GiMT TAXATION 92 (Supp. 1946).
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tion whose "section 341 assets" have appreciated substantially in
value might attempt to avoid the statutory presumption by contribut-
ing liquid assets to the corporation's capital to dilute the value of the
"section 341 assets" to less than fifty percent of the total assets. Per-
haps the "business purpose" doctrine could be used by the Com-
missioner as an alternative weapon against an attempt to drown the
corporation's "section 341 assets" in a sea of other assets by con-
tributions to capital having no nontax purpose.
In applying the presumption of section 341 (c), the appreciation in
"section 341 assets" is measured against their basis, not against the
shareholders' investment. Thus, if the shareholders invest $15,000 in
a corporation, and it constructs "section 341 assets" as a cost of $100,-
000 (represented by $15,000 of equity investment and $85,000 of bor-
rowed funds), the presumption of section 341 (c) will not be ap-
plicable if the assets increase in value to only $115,000 (this being less
than 120 percent of their basis), even though the appreciation rep-
resents a profit of 100 percent on the shareholders' investment. If the
assets increased in value to $120,000, however, section 341 (c) would
become applicable; and this would be true even if the shareholders
had financed the entire cost of construction ($100,000) with their own
funds and had enjoyed a gain of only twenty percent on their invest-
ment.
Since the presumption of section 341 (c) is rebuttable, it is open to
the taxpayer to establish that the corporation is not "collapsible"
because it was not formed or availed of principally for the purposes
set out in section 341 (b) or because the requisite "view" did not exist.
Section 341 (c) also provides that its inapplicability shall not give rise
to a presumption that the corporation was not a collapsible corpora-
tion.
The statutory limitations of section 341(d).-Even though the
corporation is "collapsible" under the foregoing principles, section
341 (d) makes the punitive rules of section 341 inapplicable to a
shareholder unless all three of these conditions are satisfied:
1. More than 5 percent of stock.-The shareholder is not subject to
section 341 unless he owns (a) more than five percent in value of the
outstanding stock, or (b) stock that is attributed to another share-
holder who owns more than five percent of the stock.41 The owner-
ship of stock is to be determined under a set of constructive owner-
ship rules, and the specified amount of stock will be fatal if owned
when the manufacture, construction or production of property is
begun, when "section 341 assets" are purchased, or at any time
thereafter.
41. See Butler v. Patterson, 148 F. Supp. 197, 50 AFTR 1504 (N.D. Ala.
1957).
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2. Seventy percent of gain attributable to collapsible property.-
Section 341 is not applicable to the shareholder's gain during a tax-
able year unless more than seventy percent is attributable to the
manufactured, constructed, produced, or purchased property. By
virtue of this limitation, section 341 (a) becomes inapplicable if thirty
percent or more of a shareholder's gain in a particular taxable year
is attributable to noncollapsible property.
42
3. Gain after expiration of three years.-Finally, section 341 is
inapplicable to gain realized by a shareholder after the expiration
of three years following the completion of manufacture, construction,
production or purchase of the collapsible property. This is a treacher-
ous exception, since the breadth of the term "manufacture, construc-
tion or production" makes it very difficult to say when the process
has been "completed.
'43
The amnesty of section 341(e).-Section 341 (e), enacted in 1958,
ameliorates the rigors of the collapsible corporation provisions in four
respects:
1. Sale or exchange of stock.-If certain conditions are satisfied,
a shareholder's gain on the sale or exchange of the stock of an
otherwise collapsible corporation is exempted from section 341
(a) (1), and hence will be taxed as long-term capital gain.
2. Complete liquidation.-In certain circumstances, a share-
holder's gain on the complete liquidation of an otherwise collap-
sible corporation is exempted from section 341 (a) (2), and hence
will be taxed as long-term capital gain.
3. Eligibility for section 333.-Certain otherwise collapsible
corporations are made eligible for the benefits of section 333
(elective nonrecognition of shareholder gain on one-month liqui-
dations4).
4. Eligibility for section 337.-Certain otherwise collapsible
corporations are made subject to section 337 (nonrecognition of
corporate gain or loss on sales within 12 month period following
adoption of plan of complete liquidation 45 ).
The exemptions described in categories one and two above are granted
shareholder-by-shareholder so that some shareholders of a corpora-
tion may qualify while others do not. The exemptions of categories
three and four, however, are granted to the corporation itself, so
that all shareholders of the corporation will benefit if the specified
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (4) (1955). See also Glickman v. Commissioner,
supra note 25.
43. Supra at note 25. In Rev. Rul. 57-491, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 232, it was held
that the three-year period of § 341(d) (3) includes the holding period of
certain predecessors.
44. See p. 133 supra.
45. See p. 132 supra.
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-conditions are met. Section 341 (e), it will be noted, does not apply
to gain realized on a partial liquidation or on a distribution in excess
of the basis of stock; these transactions remain subject to the un-
abated vigor of section 341 (a) (2) and (3).
Section 341 (e) is intended solely as a relief measure: it establishes
a zone of safety, and any shareholder who can bring himself within
this zone is protected against the collapsible corporation provisions,
regardless of the nature of the corporation. Section 341 (e) also pro-
:vides that the failure to meet its requirements shall not be taken into
account in determining whether a corporation is a collapsible corpora-
tion under the statutory definition of section 341 (b), and that this
determination shall be made as if section 341 (e) had not been
'enacted.
4 6
The provisions of section 341 (e) stem largely, though not entirely,
-from the 1954 changes in section 34147 under which a corporation
formed to purchase section 1231 (b) property (e.g., an apartment
house) may be a collapsible corporation by virtue of section 341 (b)
(3) (d), although the shareholders could in the alternative have
acquired the property as individuals and reported their gain on a sale
as long-term capital gain unless they were dealers in such property.
It is perilous to summarize the fearfully intricate conditions of sec-
tion 341 (e), but its underlying theory is that the collapsible corpora-
tion provisions should not be applicable if the net unrealized
appreciation in the corporation's "subsection (e) assets" (roughly
speaking, property held by the corporation which would produce
,ordinary income if sold either by the corporation itself or by its
shareholders) amounts to less than fifteen percent of the corpora-
tion's net worth.48 This theory is applied with important variations
to each of the four events listed above.
Before turning to these conditions and variations, we must first
examine the term "subsection (e) assets," a new phrase which is
employed throughout section 341 (e). This term is defined by section
341 (e) (5) (A) to include the following categories of property held
by the corporation:
1. Property not used in the trade or business. Any such property
is a "subsection (e) asset" if the corporation's gain on a sale
46. See § 341(e) (11).
47. Supra at p. 133 note 13, p. 138.
48. The terms "net unrealized appreciation" and "net worth" are defined
by § 341(e) (6) and (7). In computing the corporation's "net worth," § 341
(e) (7) provides for the exclusion of increases in net worth during 'the pre-
ceding one-year period resulting from transfers for stock or as contribu-
tions to capital or paid-in surplus, "if it appears that there was not a bona
fide business purpose for the transaction in respect of which such amount
was received." Compare the handling of a similar problem under § 341(c) (2),
supra at p. 140.
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would be taxed as ordinary income--i.e., if the property is neither
a capital asset nor §1231 (b) property. Moreover-and this is
§341 (e)'s unique innovation-property held by the corporation
if in the hands of any shareholder owning (directly or construc-
tively)49 more than twenty percent in value of the corporation's
stock it would not be a capital asset or §1231 (b) property. Thus,
property held by the corporation constitutes a "subsection (e)
asset" if it is stock in trade, inventory property, or property held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business
in the hands of the corporation, or if it would have this status
were it held by any shareholder owning more than twenty per-
cent of the corporation's stock. If any more-than-twenty-percent
shareholder is a dealer, in other words, his status taints the cor-
poration's property.
2. Property used in the trade or business-net unrealized de-
preciation. If there is a net unrealized depreciation on assets used
in the trade or business, they constitute "subsection (e) assets."50
3. Property used in the trade or business-net unrealized ap-
preciation. If there is net unrealized appreciation in such assets,
they constitute "subsection (e) assets" if they would be neither
capital assets nor §1231 (b) assets in the hands of a more-than-
twenty-percent shareholder.51 This provision is crucial to the
purpose of §341 (e). If a corporation's sole property is an apart-
ment house or other rental property that has appreciated in
value, the property will constitute a "subsection (e) asset" only
if a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder is a dealer in such
property.
4. Copyrights and similar property. A copyright, literary
composition, or similar property is a "subsection (e) asset" if it
was created in whole or in part by the personal efforts of an
individual owning directly or constructively more than five per-
cent of the corporation's stock. By virtue of this provision, a
motion picture will be a "subsection (e) asset" if created partly
by the personal efforts of a more-than-five-percent shareholder.
The function of the new category of "subsection (e) assets" is to
49. Throughout § 341(e), with a minor exception, the ownership of stock
is determined by a set of constructive ownership rules. § 341(e) (10).
50. The Senate Report on § 341 (e), S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), 1958-3 Cum. BuLL. 922, does not state why depreciated property used
in the trade or business is included if there is net unrealized depreciation in
such assets. Since such assets would ordinarily qualify for the hotchpot of
§ 1231(b) and give rise to ordinary losses if the net result of the hotchpot
were a loss, it may have been thought appropriate to include them in the
§ 341 (e) calculation in order to counterbalance appreciation in inventory and
similar property.
51. Supra note 47.
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permit a determination of whether there has been a significant in-
crease in the value of the assets which would produce ordinary
income upon sale by either the corporation or a more-than-twenty-
percent shareholder,52 since in the absence of such an increase in the
value of the ordinary income assets, the corporation is to be relieved
of the collapsible corporation restrictions. As stated earlier, however,
this test is applied with variations to each of the four situations to
which section 341 (e) is applicable, and we now turn to these varia-
tions.
1. Sale or exchange of stock.-Section 341(e) (1) makes section
341(a) (1) inapplicable to a sale or exchange of stock if the net
unrealized appreciation in the corporation's "subsection (e) assets"
does not exceed fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth and
if the shareholder does not own more than five percent of the corpora-
tion's stock.53 If the shareholder owns between five and twenty per-
cent of the stock, a similar calculation is made, but he must take into
account not only the corporation's "subsection (e) assets" but also
any corporate assets which would produce ordinary income if held by
him by virtue of section 341 (e) (1) (B). And if the shareholder owns
more than twenty percent of the stock, his calculation must also take
into account any corporate assets which would have produced ordinary
income (a) if he owned them and (b) if he had held in his individual
capacity the property of certain other corporations of which he owned
more than twenty percent of the stock in the preceding three years
under section 341 (e) (1) (C). Thus, the corporate assets will not
only be tainted-as to all shareholders, under the definition of "sub-
section (e) assets" in section 341 (e) (5) (A) (i) and (ii) -by the
dealer status of a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder, but also-
as to him only, under section 341 (e) (1) (C) -by the hypothetical
dealer status that he would have attained had he engaged in business
as an individual, rather than in corporate form, during the preceding
three years.
The net result of these extraordinary statutory gyrations is that
profit on the sale of stock of an otherwise collapsible corporation will
qualify as long-term capital gain unless the assets of the corporation
(and, hence, presumably the gain on the stock) reflect a significant
amount of unrealized ordinary income-the corporate veil being
pierced for the purpose of determining the amount of unrealized
52. Five per cent in the case of a copyright, literary composition, or similar
property.
53. Such a shareholder might find it simpler to take refuge in § 341(d) (1),
which makes § 341 (a) inapplicable to certain not-more-than-5% share-
holders, but that sanctuary is closed to a shareholder who owned more than
5% of the stock at any time after manufacture, etc., commenced, as well
as to a shareholder, e.g., an estate or trust, whose shares are attributed to a
more-than-5% shareholder. Section 341 (e) (1) is not quite so exclusive.
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ordinary income, in order to take account of assets that might have
changed their character by the interposition of a corporation between
the shareholder and the assets.
To illustrate the operation of section 341 (e) (1), assume that a cor-
poration has three stockholders, unrelated to each other, whose hold-




Assume also that the corporation's assets fall into four categories, as follows:
Net unrealized
- Class appreciation Nature of asset
W $10,000 Stock in trade in hands of corporation.
X $10,000 Capital asset to corporation; but would be stock in
trade if held by C but not if held by A or B.
Y $10,000 Capital asset to corporation; but would be stock in
trade if held by B, though not if held by A or C.
Z $20,000 Capital asset to corporation; but would be stock in
trade if held by C and if sales by certain corpora-
tions in which C was interested during preceding 3
years were treated as sales by C or if sales by C of
stock in such corporations were treated as sales by
him of his share of assets.
Under section 341 (e) (5) (A), the corporation's "subsection (e)
assets" would include Classes W and X. Consequently, on a sale of
stock by A the net unrealized appreciation of the corporation would
be $20,000, and if this does not exceed fifteen percent of the corpora-
tion's net worth, the corporation could not be collapsible as to A.
On a sale of stock to B, however, the net unrealized appreciation
would be $30,000, since section 341 (e) (1) (A) and (B) require him
to take into account not only the corporation's "subsection (e) assets"
(Classes W and X), but also any corporate assets which would be
"subsection (e) assets" if he held more than twenty percent of the
stock (Class Y). B, therefore, can take advantage of section 341 (e)
(1) only if $30,000 does not exceed fifteen percent of the corporation's
net worth. Finally, if C invokes section 341 (e) (1), he must take into
account Classes W, X, and Z (but not Class Y) in determining the
net unrealized appreciation under section 341 (e) (1) (A) and (C).
For him, section 341 (e) (1) will be applicable only if $40,000 does
not exceed fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth.
For another example, which is both similar and more typical of
section 341 (e)'s intended operation, assume a corporation (Smith-
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Jones, Inc.) owned equally by Smith and Jones (who are unrelated),j
the sole asset of which is an appreciated apartment house. Assume
also that neither Smith nor Jones is a dealer in such property, but
that Jones has owned more than twenty percent of the stock of
certain other real estate corporations during the preceding three
years. In these circumstances Smith-Jones, Inc., owns no "subsection
(e) assets," either in its own right or by attribution from Smith or
Jones. As to Smith, the net unrealized appreciation under section 341
(e) (1) is zero, and a sale or exchange of his stock (except to the
issuing corporation or to a "related person") is exempt from the
operation of section 341 (a) (1). As to Jones, it is necessary to de-
termine whether more than seventy percent in value of the assets of
any of the other corporations are similar or related in use or service
to the property held by Smith-Jones, Inc. If so, Jones is to be treated
(a) as though any sale or exchange by him of stock in such other
corporation (while he owned more than twenty percent of its stock),
had been a sale by him of his proportionate share of the corporation's
assets, and (b) as though any sale or exchange by such other cor-
poration (while he owned more than twenty percent of its stock)
which was subject to section 337 (a) had been a sale by Jones of his
proportionate share of the property. If, taking into account these
hypothetical sales or exchanges by Jones, he would have been a
dealer in the type of property held by Smith-Jones, Inc.,5 he can
make use of section 341 (e) (1) only if the net unrealized appreciation
in the property of Smith-Jones, Inc. does not exceed fifteen percent
of the corporation's net worth.
Section 341 (e) (1) cannot be invoked if the stock is sold to the
issuing corporation; 55 nor does it apply to a more-than-twenty-per-
cent shareholder if the stock is sold to a "related person" as defined
by section 341 (e) (8).
2. Complete liquidations.-A shareholder's gain on a complete
liquidation is exempted by section 341 (e) (2) from section 341 (a) (2).
-and hence can enjoy long-term capital gain treatment-if two con-
54. When § 341 (e) (1) (C) is applicable, the shareholder is treated as though
he had sold his proportionate share of property held by the other corporations
during the preceding three-year period. The mere fact that these corpora-
tions were or were not dealers in the property in question is not relevant;
the purpose of imputing sales to the shareholder is to determine his status,
based on both these hypothetical sales and any actual sales by him of similar
properties held in his individual capacity. The number and frequency of
sales.-are usually only two of the factors determining -whether the taxpayer
is a dealer, however, and it is not clear whether § 341(e) (1) (C) attributes to
the shareholder not only his proportionate share of the corporations' assets,
but also his share of any corporate activity (use of agents, advertising, etc.)
that might have resulted in the sales.
55. This restriction may reflect an excess of caution, since § 341 (e) (1) is an
exception to § 341(a) (1), which embraces sales and exchanges of stock, but
not partial or complete liquidations. As to § 302(b) redemptions, however,
see supra note 10.
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ditions are met. The first is that the net unrealized appreciation in
the corporation's assets must meet the same test as is imposed by
section 341(e) (1), i.e., the appreciation in the corporation's "sub-
section (e) assets" plus, in the case of the shareholders owning more
than five or twenty percent of the stock, the appreciation in certain
other assets held by the corporation, may not exceed fifteen percent
of the corporation's net worth. The second condition is that section
337 (a) applies to the corporation by reason of section 341 (e) (4). This
condition, as will be seen 6 cannot be satisfied unless the corporation
sells substantially all of its property before the liquidation; its pur-
pose is to prevent a liquidation in kind of assets subject to deprecia-
tion or depletion, which if permitted would give the shareholders a
stepped-up basis for such assets (which could thereafter be written
off against ordinary income) at the capital gain rate.
3. Elective one-month liquidations under section 333.-Ordinarily,
the shareholders of a collapsible corporation are excluded from sec-
tion 333 (elective nonrecognition of shareholder gain on a complete
liquidation within one calendar month). Section 341 (e) (3) provides
that a corporation shall not be considered collapsible for this purpose,
however, if the unrealized appreciation in its "subsection (e) assets"
does not exclude fifteen percent of the corporation's net worth. The
term "subsection (e) assets" is modified in applying section 341 (e) (3),
so as to reduce from twenty percent to five percent the stock owner-
ship that will impose the shareholder's status on the corporate assets.
If the corporation can meet the test of section 341 (e) (3), all share-
holders may take advantage of section 333; otherwise, section 333 (a)
remains in full force and no shareholders may do so.
4. Use of section 337 by a collapsible corporation.-We have already
seen that section 337 (nonrecognition of corporate gain or loss on
certain sales within the one-year period following the adoption of a
plan of complete liquidation) is not applicable to a collapsible cor-
poration.57 Section 341 (e) (4) lifts this barrier to a limited extent.
Under section 341 (e) (4) an otherwise collapsible corporation be-
comes subject to section 337 if:
1. At all times following the adoption of the plan of complete
liquidation, the net unrealized appreciation in its "subsection (3)
assets" does not exceed 15 percent of its net worth;
2. It sells substantially all the property owned by it on the date
the plan of liquidation was adopted within the twelve-month
period following that date; and
3. Following the adoption of the plan, it does not distribute any
depreciable or similar property.
56. Infra at p. 148-49.
57. Section 337 (c) (1) (A).
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The first of the foregoing conditions (with variations noted above)
is common to section 341 (e) (1), (2), (3) and (4)-relief from the
collapsible corporation provisions is granted only to corporations
whose ordinary income assets have not appreciated significantly in
value. Thus, the shareholders of a corporation holding substantially
appreciated assets that in its hands are (or the hands of any more-
than-twenty-percent shareholder would be) inventory property or
stock in trade may not employ section 337 to obtain capital gain on a
sale by having the corporation sell the property and distribute the
proceeds in liquidation. The second and third conditions have a
different purpose: even if the corporation's ordinary income assets
have not appreciated substantially in value, the corporation is not
permitted to distribute some of its assets in kind in order to give its
shareholders a stepped-up basis for them at the lenient long-term
capital gain rate. Thus, the second condition requires the corporation
to sell substantially all of its assets if it wishes to come under section
337; it may not sell some, and transfer the rest by a liquidating distri-
bution in kind to its shareholders. The third condition overlaps the
second to a considerable degree: it forbids the distribution of corporate
property that is depreciable (or subject to amortization or depletion)
in the hands of either the corporation or the distributee. Since the
second condition requires "substantially all of the properties" held
by the corporation when the plan of liquidation is adopted to be sold
within the twelve-month period thereafter, the third condition would
be automatically satisfied as to such properties, but it has the ad-
ditional effect of preventing the distribution of any depreciable,
amortizable and depletable properties that may fall outside the
"substantially all" clause or that were not held by the corporation
when the plan of liquidation was adopted. If property is distributed
before the plan is formally adopted in an effort to avoid the impact
of these conditions, the plan may be "pre-dated. '58
A final restriction in section 341 (e) (4) makes it inapplicable to
any sale to a more-than-twenty-percent shareholder, or to a person
related to such a shareholder, f the property so sold is subject to
depreciation, depletion or amortization in the hands of either the
corporation or the buyer. By virtue of this restriction, section 341 (e) -
(4) and hence section 337 may be applicable to some of the corpora-
tion's sales but not to others,59 so that an otherwise collapsible corpora-
tion may employ section 337 to ward off gain on some sales, while
avoiding section 337 on sales producing losses (by selling to a more-
than-twenty-percent shareholder), an ironic result in view of the
58. See § 337(a); Rev. Rul. 57-140, 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 118.
59. See the Senate Report on the Technical Amendments Act of 1958. S.
REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1958), acknowledging the possibility
of a selective application of § 337 by virtue of § 341 (e) (4).
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effort to prevent corporations from straddling section 337.60 The
irony will be heightened by the fact that the shareholder, not the
government, will be seeking to establish that the corporation is
collapsible.
Another problem in this final restriction on section 341 (e) (4) is
whether a "sale" of appreciated corporate property to shareholders
pro rata (e.g., if two fifty percent shareholders each "purchase" a
fifty per cent interest in depreciable assets) will be treated as a true
sale. If so, the corporation will be subject to tax on the sale (prob-
ably under section 1231(a), at the capital gain rate), but the share-
holders will obtain a stepped-up basis for the property; at the same
time, the other sales by the corporation will be subject to section
337, and the liquidation will produce capital gain for the share-
holders by virtue of section 341 (e) (2). If, on the other hand, the
transaction is treated as a distribution in kind of the property, rather
than as a "sale" followed by a distribution of the proceeds of sale, sec-
tion 341 (e) (4) (B) and (C) will have been violated, with the result
that section 337 will not apply to the corporation's sales of other prop-
erty. This, in turn, will make section 341 (e) (2) inapplicable at the
shareholder level to the liquidation.
60. See supra note 56.
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